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859.257.7271
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Water quality credit trading is a method by which firms and individuals can swap “rights
to discharge” in order to lower the overall costs of reducing pollution while keeping the
quality of the resource the same or better. Perhaps the most famous of these methods is
used in air quality where sulfur emission allocations (credits) can be traded. Based on the
notion of that program, quality credit trading is being considered in other environmental
quality areas like water. However, this idea has also generated tremendous policy debate
over the years. While trading water quality credits has been tried with various degrees of
success in other states it has not yet been used in Kentucky. We discuss the potential
costs and benefits that trading provides and the basic market structures that could be
considered.
The basic idea of the program is simple: allow businesses and individuals to exchange
rights to pollute, while holding the overall level of pollution to a given standard. This
process gives an incentive to emitters who have relatively low costs of abatement to
reduce their emissions as much as possible, by providing them with the ability to earn
credits that they can sell to emitters that have relatively high costs of abatement. Thus,
the overall costs are lowered–those with the lowest costs make the greatest amount of
reductions, while those that find abatement expensive do not have to actually make
reductions in effluent, but can purchase credits to cover their emissions. The overall
quality of the resource does not change, at least in theory, because the number of credits
available is limited to keep the total amount of pollution the same, as it would be without
the program. The number of credits available can also be gradually reduced so that the
overall level of pollution decreases.
The problem comes in setting up a system whereby trades can be made. Trades must be
legally allowable–comply with all rules and regulations and credits must be set in such a
way that the credit being offered for sale is equivalent to the credit that is needed by the
buyer. The location of the trades should be similar so that the reductions take place in one
local while the credit use (i.e. non-reductions) take place in another. And the pollutants
(type and amount) involved in the trade should have the same biological impact, so that
quality levels stay the same or improve. Trading ratios are developed to meet these
requirements. Trading ratios in water quality have not been standardized–so the variables
involved have to be carefully considered for the market system used.
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There are several types of market systems that can be used for a basis for trading. Several
market systems have been tried in other states; however, credit markets have not yet been
evaluated within the state of Kentucky. Kentucky represents a unique environment
because of its geology and socio-economic position. Geologically, the state is
underpinned by limestone, which results in a karst environment. Numerous streams and
rivers dip underneath the ground and resurface miles downstream making managing
water pollution a challenge.
The most simple market system is one in which one emitter makes an arrangement with
another for a particular credit allocation. This one-on-one approach, also known as
bilateral negotiations, is administratively intensive for all involved. The buyer/seller must
find each other, generate and agree to a contract for the credits. The regulatory agency
then must approve the agreement–insuring that the quality trade does in fact result in no
loss in environmental quality (EPA, 2008). This market structure does not encourage a
high number of trades, because emitters have to go through so much work to make the
trade.
At the other extreme a market exchange provides a trading environment in which buyers
and sellers can easily find each other to make a trade. And because multiple trades are
taking place, the going price of quality credits is easily observed. Credits and trading
ratios have to be very uniform in this environment so that buyers and sellers can make
comparisons between the prices and quantities being offered. Participants in this market
also need the assurance that whatever credit they buy is equivalent to the credit they need
for compliance (EPA, 2008). The only possible assurance is the regulatory standard by
which the credits are generated, bought, and sold. Therefore, while relatively simple for
buyers and sellers, the regulatory aspect of this program is intense.
The water-quality clearinghouse market structure is another trading environment. In this
environment an intermediary like the government is responsible for generating the
credits. Credits generated under this system are paid for and monitored by the third party
and then sold to emitters that want to use them. This system combines the market
exchange and the bilateral negotiations. However, the regulatory burden is still high
under this system.
Finally, sole source offsets are often considered under trading programs even though they
do not actually involve trades between multiple businesses or organizations. Under this
system an emitter can generate credits for himself by reducing pollution in another area.
These offsets can result in the same cost savings as traditional trades, but care must still
be taken to not create a reduction in water quality as a result of the in-house trade.
We will conclude the discussion by outlining the policy debate regarding the water
quality trading programs.
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PROGRAMS IN THE KENTUCKY RIVER WATERSHED IN THE CONTEXT OF
WATER QUALITY TRADING
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400. C. E. Barnhart Building
Lexington, KY 40546
859.257.7271
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Water Quality Trading (WQT) is an innovative approach for pollution mitigation that
would trade pollution rights. With WQT, there is potential to include non-point sources
(NPS) of pollution that have thus far been excluded from the federal regulations that are
in effect for point sources (PS) of pollution through the Clean Water Act. There is interest
to make Kentucky River watershed farmers participate in water quality conservation
through a WQT scheme. Such a market would trade pollution rights between point
sources and non-point sources of pollution. Through trades, pollution cost of compliance
can be smaller compared to a pollution fee, and pollution can be reduced in a larger
amount than with the tax option or standards. Such WQT innovative schemes between
NPS and PS have not yet been very successful due to farmers’ low participation (Breetz
et al., 2004).
This study tries to find if a relationship exists between specific farm operations, extension
programs and sources of government funding that target conservation practices. Farm
profile that receives funding to engage in conservation in the potential context of a
trading scheme of water quality is introduced. From the results, inferences can be made
for the design of a successful feasibility study about WQT in the Kentucky River
watershed.
This study makes the following contribution to the literature: First, this is the first such
analysis ever conducted in the Kentucky River watershed. Second, in addition to farm
and farmer characteristics, additional secondary data were gathered in this study, which
may be more relevant to the decision of adoption. Such data included the impact of
university extension contacts and programs that are related to environment protection and
resource use. Third, we present our study in the context of WQT, which generates both
pushes and pulls towards producers’ decision to participate in government payment
programs. The dynamics between cost-share funds and the incentives in WQT can be
better explored.
With the help of the Farm Service Agency (FSA) monthly Conservation Reserve
Program (CRP) Contract Reports, from the National Agricultural Statistical Service
(NASS) of the 2007 Census of Agriculture (County data), secondary data on CRP
payments (funding) per county were collected. Also data were collected on number of
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farms per county, average farm area, percentage of crop area per county, percentage of
pasture area per county, the level of Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP)
payments per county, the level of Wildlife Habitat Incentives Program (WHIP) payments
per county, from the Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) KY State
Conservationist County database. And finally, from the Kentucky Cooperative Extension
System reports from the University of Kentucky, secondary data were also collected on
the total number of extension contacts made by KY state extension specialists. Previous
studies have used measurements of farmer education and have found they positively
contributed to a larger participation in conservation programs through BMP adoption (P.
Ghazalian, B. Larue, and G. West, 2009).
Preliminary results show that the level of CRP payments positively correlates with the
number of farms, average farm size, and percentage of cropland in a county. But, the
higher the percentage of pastureland in a county, the lower the CRP payments, which was
expected since CRP is a land retirement program, it financially rewards conversion of
cropland into grasslands or forestlands. CRP payments are affected by multiple program
participation, where EQIP is positively related to CRP, whereas WHIP is negatively
related. Finally, the number of concurrent extension contacts made by Kentucky state
agriculture extension specialists does not have strong impact on the level of total CRP
payments in a county. Further analysis is to prove the lagged effects of extension
contacts.
Creating a market for water pollution mitigation from agriculture presents some
challenges. Uncertainty over the number of offsets or allowances agriculture can produce
is one issue. The transactions costs of bringing together buyers and sellers in a market for
offsets can be high, because of agriculture’s heterogeneous nature and the fact that offsets
are associated with the land. Finally, lack of coordination between conservation programs
and markets could affect market function. WQT markets and conservation programs may
compete for the same land, driving up the price of offsets. Enrollment in conservation
programs may raise the issue of additionality, and whether practices adopted with support
from financial assistance can be a source of offsets or allowances. The present paper is
successful in attempting to provide a framework for a WQT development, showing that
regions that contain large farms and greater number of farms are prone to conservation
practices adoption if there is compensation. Future research including farmers’ inputs on
the trading schemes and scenarios, and a thorough mapping of the region’s physical
characteristics and NPS and PS locations will conclude a successful assessment of the
feasibility of a WQT.
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Introduction
Since the 1972 enactment of federal legislation known as the Clean Water Act (CWA),
point-source (PS) polluters (e.g., municipal wastewater treatment plants) have been
required to obtain permits and comply with effluent restrictions under the National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES). Although significant progress has
been made, substantial challenges remain. Reports indicate that up to 64% of assessed
surface water bodies remain impaired, unable to support their designated uses (EPA,
2009). Non-point sources (NPS) of pollution—including nutrients (nitrogen and
phosphorus) and sediment from agricultural runoff—are a leading factor in this
impairment.
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), charged with administering regulations
under the CWA, supports the use of water quality trading (WQT) programs as a means to
address current water quality problems (EPA, 2003). Such programs have the potential to
pursue several desirable objectives. Offset credit mechanisms can expand participation in
water quality improvement to hitherto unregulated agricultural producers and similar
NPS polluters, by providing financial incentives to engage in voluntary abatement.
It is widely held that the marginal abatement costs are lower for NPS than for the heavily
regulated PS polluters, such that WQT has the potential to significantly lower the costs to
society of achieving a given level of water quality (Faeth, 2000). However, costreduction can occur even when trading takes place among PS with heterogeneous cost
structures (e.g., due to differences in age or type of equipment, economies of scale, nature
of influents) without participation by NPS. WQT programs also have the potential to
increase flexibility and availability of different options for improving water quality and to
encourage innovation in related technology. Similar programs related to control of air
quality have enjoyed substantial success (Stavins, 1998).
Research Objectives
This research develops a profile of current point-source pollution in the Kentucky River
watershed, as part of a larger project to evaluate the feasibility of a WQT program in this
area. Particular attention is paid to characteristics related to the objectives and
requirements of WQT specified by EPA policy (EPA, 2003). Thus, we focus on nutrientrelated impairments, examine PS locations relative to potential NPS participants, analyze

61

potential trading areas corresponding to receiving waters and TMDL boundaries, and
allow for non-degradation constraints for individual segments.
Data and Methodology
The study relies on NPDES permit and compliance data made available by the Kentucky
Division of Water. We build upon the methodologies of Roberts, et al (2008) and Kieser
& Associates (2004) to delineate potential WQT markets and analyze PS characteristics.
We examine alternative regulatory scenarios to compare trading feasibility under
different conditions. In addition, GIS software was used to examine the geospatial
connections among PS, NPS, and impaired waters.
Results
Preliminary results suggest that potential for trading is limited under current regulatory
standards. However, stricter regulation of point sources as states try to comply with water
quality standards could create potential for WQT as a mechanism for decreasing the costs
of such compliance.
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Introduction
Nonpoint source (NPS) pollution from agricultural practices is generally exempt from
federal regulation. However, some voluntary programs allow point sources subject to the
Clean Water Acts’s (CWA) effluent limitations to meet their standards by purchasing
offset credits reflecting reductions in NPS discharges to the same waters (USEPA 2004).
Such water quality trading (WQT) programs have been implemented in a number of
states to reduce pollution abatement costs (Breetz et al 2004). In this setting, NPS supply
pollution abatement when they implement best management practices (BMP) that reduce
nutrient loads, and the cost of BMPs form a supply curve for credits. WQT programs are
supported by the EPA as an important means for efficiently pursuing water quality goals
(USEPA 2003).
Among the BMPs available for water quality management, riparian buffer strips have
proven effective in mitigating the movement of nutrients and other pollutants into surface
waters (Qiu et al 2006). Estimates of riparian buffer costs would be valuable for
developing policy related to WQT and other conservation programs. This paper estimates
the annual costs of buffer strips in six counties in the Lower Kentucky River Basin, as
part of a project evaluating the feasibility of WQT programs in that area.
Objectives
The objectives of this study include: 1) Quantify the annualized costs of installing and
maintaining a 200-foot riparian buffer strip on agricultural land adjoining waterways in
the watershed. 2) Develop a supply curve for such buffer strips, which can be converted
to the supply curve for offset credits in a WQT system.
Methodology
We select six counties in the Lower Kentucky River Basin, which are characterized by a
high proportion of nutrient-impaired waterways and for which a total maximum daily
load (TMDL) of pollutants either has been approved or is under development. These
characteristics indicate that NPS offset credits may be in demand for those counties.
To estimate costs, we adapt the methodology used by Roberts et al (2009). Potential
buffer strip areas are geographically located and their agricultural land uses are identified
using National Land Cover Data (USGS, 2001) and ArcGIS software. In the Lower
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Kentucky River Basin, a 200-foot riparian buffer strip throughout the entire watershed
would cover 176,155 hectares (7.7% of all land in the basin). Of this area, 61,914
hectares are classified as pasture/hay and 2,949 hectares are classified as row crops.
The cost of riparian buffers on cropland includes the opportunity cost for forgone
production, as well as the costs of establishing and maintaining the buffer strips. Forgone
production (weighted average return per hectare, corn and soybeans) is determined from
cropping practices and soil fertility, using spatially disaggregated data from the Web Soil
Survey Database. The cost of riparian buffers on pasture land is derived from average
rental rates and the cost of exclusion (fencing), as well as establishment and maintenance
expenses.
These costs can be aggregated over the six counties, forming a supply curve of the buffer
strip area that would be supplied at various prices, assuming that the price equals the
marginal cost of an additional hectare of buffer strip. In turn, the supply of buffer strips
can be converted into a supply function for NPS nutrient reductions, which can then be
compared with demand for such credits by point sources seeking to reduce their
emissions to comply with federal regulation.
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